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Abstract 
 
This article examines the discourses of masculinity to pervade debates on the United 
Kingdom’s exit from the European Union.  The article outlines an association between 
excessive forms of masculinity and popular cultural discourses around conflict and war, 
constructing and reproducing a popular lexicon on the British experience of World War II in 
ways that are widely interpreted as symptomatic of a coarsening of political discussion.  
However, the article also emphasises the performative quality of these masculine discourses 
in line with the personalisation of politics, and stresses the scope for contestation and 
ridicule.  The article thereby identifies the articulation of a performative masculinity with a 
nation-based politics of the right, which, while disputable and occasionally subject to 
derision, produces a gendered component in any antagonistic turn in contemporary political 
culture. 
 
Keywords: Masculinity, political communications, political rhetoric, European Union, 
populism 
 
 
2 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Political campaigning around the terms of the United Kingdom’s exit from the European Union 
(Brexit) both transcended party lines and excited debate around the content and tone of political 
culture.  Even though a July 2016 public referendum returned a narrow majority for the UK’s 
departure from the EU, by late 2019 the terms of the exit were unresolved and the subject of 
rancour.  Often contrary to the official policies of their parties, many individual Members of 
Parliament openly contested the terms of departure, even calling for the referendum to be revoked 
or rerun.  In its apparent chaos, this process of Brexit typifies recent developments in political 
culture.  For one thing, the manner in which Brexit has cleaved the political establishment is 
consistent with what Mouffe (2005) describes as an “agonistic” political culture, rejecting consensus 
in order to foreground a dynamic contest of ideas and interests.  Secondly, and related to the 
individualised terms within which this agonistic dispute is pursued, Brexit has opened a space for a 
politics of personalisation and private renown (Langer 2011), sets the conditions for politicians to for 
speak on a personal rather than party basis. 
 
Disquiet over Brexit’s implications for the relationship between language and political culture extend 
into the political realm itself.  In a highly publicised intervention, Labour MP Paula Sherriff stood in 
the House of Commons to assert that PM Boris Johnson “continually used pejorative language” in 
relation to Brexit and the lesson is that fellow parliamentarians “must moderate our language” 
(Hansard 2019).  MP from the governing Conservative Party Amber Rudd also charged the Prime 
Minister with employing “the sort of language people think legitimises a more aggressive approach 
and sometimes violence” (BBC 2019).  In contextualising this aggressive language, political 
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commentators have also remarked on the prominence of men in the Brexit campaign, drawing upon 
a longer-established concern about the dynamic between politics and the masculine (see Hooper 
2001).  In her Guardian column, Catherine Bennett (2018) lamented that Brexit had become a 
“vehicle for hypermasculine displaying”.  Similarly, in the political magazine the New Statesman, 
James Millar (2018) describes Brexit as a vortex of “toxic masculinity”.   
 
Such links between inflated masculinity and politics are neither novel nor confined to Brexit.  Smith 
(2016) directs us to a range of examples, from the overt misogyny of Berlusconi in Italy to the 
cultivated menace of Putin in Russian, where political power is articulated with excessive masculine 
display.  In Brexit, however, we will see that particular types of masculinity come to dominate.  In 
one of several similar interventions, rich in the popular war imagery we will discuss below, 
newspaper columnist Marina Hyde (2018) refers to the “psychopathic machismo” of the main Brexit 
players.  As Connell (2005) emphasises, such discourses of masculinity are not equivalent to the 
mere being of men, but rather speak to the varieties of activity and representation that situates the 
masculine at different points within a “gender order”.  In illustrating this place of masculinity within 
a field of comparative judgement, Fahey (2007) highlights the mobilisation of discourses around 
Continental Europe and femininity in a discussion of the symbolic emasculation of former US 
presidential candidate John Kerry, asserting “masculinity” as a measure of fitness to govern.   
 
Beer and bravado: masculine consumption and heroic bearing 
 
Having highlighted these discussions around Brexit and their implications for political culture, the 
initial component of the analysis will now look at examples of performed masculinity in political talk 
around Brexit.  Since the Brexit argument is one primarily around political policy and sovereignty, it 
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is inevitable that explicit references to gendered identity account for a small proportion of the 
political discourse to be found there.  Nonetheless, the suggestion here is that these discursive 
activities are crucial in establishing or reiterating particular types of political agency and power.  As 
we will see in this section, these establishing discourses often take the form of conviviality rituals, 
engaging what Wodak (2009, 14), following Goffman (1972), refers to as a “back stage” performance 
of male status and mutual geniality, which in themselves sustain the political space as a male 
domain.  These forms of engagement also accord with performative aspect of producing what 
Goffman (1981: 181) calls “fresh talk” in projecting a particular political personality. 
 
As first leader of the Brexit-supporting United Kingdom Independence Party, and then head of the 
newly formed Brexit Party, Nigel Farage was a prominent figure in the Brexit campaign, his status 
confirmed in campaign interventions from the US President (The Guardian 2019).  The following 
passage is drawn from a speech introducing Farage as guest speaker to a rally of the pro-Brexit Leave 
Means Leave movement on 21 January 2019, and demonstrates a specific kind of myth making in 
the description of Farage’s character.  (In this extract and those that follow, ellipses denote pauses 
and xx denotes audience applause.):  
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
He (xxx5xxx) and that courage was of course epitomised (.) when had a slight argument (.) 
with an aeroplane (.) about eight years ago (..) when he crashed (..) it was pretty nasty (…) 
it would’ve killed some people (.) but not our Nigel (..) oh no (….) he dragged himself out 
(..) wiped away the blood from his forehead (.) dusted himself down (…) looked around 
the field (.) put his hands (.) in his pockets (..) pulled out a fag and promptly (.) lit it 
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This passage assists in the illusion of Farage as embodying a particular iteration of British 
masculinity.  As the applause occasioned by the teasingly unspecified male pronoun acknowledges 
(line 1), this is produced as an amiable rehearsal of the qualities of a speaker held in mutual 
affection.  As a piece of mediated public talk, the commitment is the projection of a “media 
personality” (Tolson 1991) more than the conveyance of information.  The narrative itself follows a 
common trajectory.  It builds from the markedly understated “slight argument” (line 1), the humour 
of which rests on an ironic relationship with supposed irascibility of Farage and the absurd contrast 
of “with an aeroplane”, before reverting to the sobering “it was pretty nasty (…) it would have killed 
some people”; the gravity of the concluding assessment emphasised by a substantial pause.  As a 
passage concerned mainly with the ritualised obligation to maximise the audience’s affection for 
their guest speaker, the facticity of the account is of limited immediate relevance.  Yet it is worth 
noting that, contrary to the account presented here, images of the crash show that far from having 
“dragged himself out”, Farage was rescued by two onlookers and taken to an ambulance for 
treatment.  Nonetheless, the introduction’s mythologised produces an illustrative fable on Farage’s 
personal resilience. 
 
Of course, even if the intrusion of accuracy would serve only to puncture the jovial mood, what is 
more telling about this passage are the tropes within which Farage’s actions are presented.  His 
response is crafted into a heroic narrative in which he shrugs off the effects of the crash and gathers 
his composure: exiting the stricken plane and removing the markers of physical injury and 
dishevelment (“wipes away the blood from his forehead (…) dusted himself down”), engaging in a 
casual reconnoitre of the circumstances (“looked around the field”), before reinstating a carefree 
demeanour (“put his hands (.) in his pockets”) with the endearing vice of the informally expressed 
“fag” (British slang for a cigarette).  Overall, the mood is one of Farage’s manly insouciance in 
responding to a life-imperilling catastrophe.   
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In the context of British popular culture, the description draws upon popular tropes around male 
heroism including fictional spy James Bond (Hoxha 2011) and the “downed” Royal Air Force fighter 
pilot in popular depictions of the 1940 Battle of Britain (Smith 2000).  Again, realism has limited 
purchase in these representations.  Although historians have emphasised the brutal realities for 
downed allied pilots in a dogfight (Overy 2004), Aldgate and Richards (2007, 296) stress the 
distracting necessity of humour in the portrayal of British airmen.  Popular depictions of the Battle of 
Britain are rich in the imagery of the resolute British combatant, regathering their nerves in spite of 
their injuries (MacKenzie 2007, 80). 
 
Wreathed in these rhetorical laurels, Farage takes to the stage and delivers his speech from which 
the following two passages are taken.  The first of the extracts is from the introductory section of his 
speech: 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
What a great line-up of speakers (….) just a couple of disappointments for me the first 
(..) is that Rocco Forte got the protesters they were meant for me and I’m very very (..) 
disappointed (…) the second is (.) that Tim Martin (.) is doing a pub crawl (..) of a 
hundred pubs around the country (.) and he HASN’T EVEN INVITED ME 
 
In order to fully understand the expressive latitude this section of the speech enjoys, it is necessary 
to point out that this opening functions as “speech about the speech”.  This status as “meta-speech” 
enables a high level of reflexivity on Farage’s part: to produce remarks on the occasion, on the 
experience of delivering the talk, and to display his familiarity with the other participants (prominent 
Brexit supporters, hotelier Rocco Forte and Wetherspoon’s pub chain owner Tim Martin).  These 
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remarks provide the pretext for Farage to claim two distinct forms of masculine credential.  The first 
is an assertion of what Messerschmidt (2018) refers to as the hypermasculine commitment to 
conflict, produced as a mock expression of regret that protesters outside the event had directed 
their ire towards Rocco Forte rather than Farage himself.  Like the example below, this is double-
coded as an assertion of Farage’s individual standing, both as the alpha target for the enemies of the 
Brexit project, and of Farage’s enthusiasm to meet and presumably confront the protesters.   
 
The second claim draws on an association between masculinity and alcohol.  A prominent symbol of 
Farage’s populist claim of alignment with “ordinary”, “decent” people over politicians has been his 
association with beer (McDougall 2017).  As Thurnell-Read (2016) has argued, beer, and the imperial 
measure overtones of the “pint of beer” in particular, occupies a mythical place at the centre of 
British male affability.  In an assessment of the relative popularity of party leaders prior to the 2015 
UK general election, Evans and Mellon (2015, 8) acknowledge the success of Farage’s “beer drinking 
man in street persona”, fun-loving, argumentative and grounded in common sense.  This associative 
pairing of Farage with a pint of beer has thereby enjoyed repetition as his trademark pose.   
 
This broad articulation between Farage’s physical courage and masculine consumption habits are 
essential components in what Kelsey (2017, 53) describes as the representation of Farage’s personal 
“journey” towards a political destiny to represent the forces of common sense; navigated by 
unconventionality and nourished by the ridicule of the political establishment.  McDougall draws 
upon the semiology of Barthes (1972) in referring to Farage as a “hyper-signifier”: 
 
…a fictional character.  This face object is at once human flesh and Spitting Image mask, a 
parody of itself.  And yet the face itself signifies in combination with the clothes worn on its 
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body and the props attached – the cigarette, the pint of warm English beer […] the 
mythology of a historical golden age of empire and cultural homogeneity (McDougall 2017, 
60). 
 
The depth of this mythical association between Farage and the myth-laden pint glass is confirmed in 
what Genova (2018, 95-96) identifies as the use of a “face-like image of spilt beer” as an item of 
synecdoche in political caricature. 
 
If a love of a pint of beer secures Farage’s status as a hero of the ordinary voter and the champion of 
the politics of common sense, then juxtaposition with other socially significant beverages produce 
their own connotations.  Fahey (2007) has already referred to the emasculation of war veteran US 
Presidential candidate John Ferry through association with the intellectual pretentions and implied 
gender ambiguity of Continental Europe.  In Farage’s discourse, similar tactics to strip rivals of their 
claim to masculinity are in evidence, where Labour leader and political enemy of Farage Jeremy 
Corbyn is shamed by his alienation from the norms of masculine consumption: 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
The only person who didn’t turn up of course (..) was Jeremy Corbyn (.) which is odd 
(…) well he’s perfectly happy to meet Hamas isn’t he (…) perfectly happy to meet 
Hezbollah (..) happy to take tea with the IRA but wouldn’t go and meet Mrs May (.) 
which I find (.) a bit strange 
 
 
In listing and amplifying Corbyn’s misdeeds, this passage from the speech has a recognisable three-
part structure, one that is common in political rhetoric and exploits the familiarity of the 
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arrangement to emphasise and choreograph approval and applause around the third item (Atkinson, 
1984).  Listed here are meetings in which Corbyn is willing to engage, proceeding through three 
political groups that the audience are likely to see as terrorists.  In terms of priming the hostility of 
the audience for the third item, the first two use a repetition of “happy to meet” Hamas and 
Hezbollah in turn (lines 2-3), whereas the third represents the meeting as “to take tea with the IRA” 
(line 3).  While clearly intended as facetious, this description has two important components.  First, 
the verb phrase “to take” emphasises ceremonial procedure over consumption, foregrounding the 
effete ends of manner and civility.  Second, are the particular connotations that are attached to tea.  
In a study of eighteenth century domestic culture, Kowaleski-Wallace (1994) describes the 
emergence of tea as “a defining British and feminine activity”, setting associative gender boundaries 
on its place in rituals of mutual belonging between women in the domestic setting.   
 
Further still, Kowaleski-Wallace (1994) points to accounts that propose tea as a potion for women to 
use upon “the man in need of humanising” as part of a “feminising and civilising force at work in 
British culture”.  In these terms, tea was not only feminine, but an active threat to norms of male 
conduct.  The rhetorical strength of the association of Corbyn, tea and proscribed terrorists 
therefore rests in a contrast: what is expressed as a friendship ceremony with those depicted as 
antidemocratic criminals, intensified in its grotesqueness by its association with the feminised 
fripperies of “taking tea”: presented in contrast with the refused democratic duty of meeting the 
Prime Minister, styled formally as “Mrs May”.  
 
Mentioning the war: Appeasement 
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Manhood is clearly a valuable commodity in the representation of Brexit.  However, the following 
sections will now consider those aspects of masculine identity that Marina Hyde highlighted in her 
column referred to above: the conduct of the Brexit debate terms motivated explicitly by the 
language of war.  It would be little surprise to Storey (2010) that the lexicon of war should feature in 
discussion of Brexit.  He argues that the contours of Britain’s cultural and political identity have been 
shaped between identification with empire and the collective memory of warfare.  While the 
identity of the belligerent forces are as subject to change as the notion of Britishness mobilised to 
counter them, Storey (2010, 12-13) points to a long-standing opposition with continental Europe, a 
tension that has intensified with the development of the European Union.  It is within this setting 
that popular tropes around the last major war in Western Europe, WWII, are sustained within 
political discourse around international politics.  We will look at the most prominent of these here, 
beginning with “appeasement” and its surrounding discourses. 
 
While “appeasement” has presented a loaded manner of describing offering concessions to an 
enemy state since prior to WWI, its common association is with UK Prime Minister Chamberlain’s 
ultimately discredited negotiations with Hitler in 1938 and with the attendant implications on the 
inherent wickedness of the enemy and on the certain failure of the appeasement.  Drawing upon 
this association with the mismanaged lead-up to WWII, “appeasement” became a way of exercising 
negative judgement in circumstances of “conflict and consensus” (Fowler 1991, 6).  Stressing its 
flexibility, Philo and McLaughlin (1995) identify “appeasement” as the dominant discourse in media 
condemnation of “spineless” economic sanctions in the lead up to the first Gulf War.  Thus, while 
trawling for instances of nouns such as “appeasement” and the phrases that follow might seem 
“pernickety”, in Chilton’s (1987) phrase, their use militarises language and colludes in the 
transaction of human affairs in a currency of organised violence. 
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In this and the section that follows, a non-date-specific search was undertaken in Nexis for the 
keyword appearing in the text of the same article as Brexit.  In a number of examples, although 
appeasement and Brexit are collocated, appeasement still retains its conventional association with 
Chamberlain’s pre-war negotiations, illustrated by the following example: 
 
Tory leaders over the years would have given different answers to the question at different 
times, sometimes contentious ones.  There were serious disagreements, for example, about 
free trade, appeasement, decolonisation and, naturally, Europe (Harris, The Daily Telegraph 
2019). 
 
While presenting a list that concludes “naturally” in an axiomatic assessment of the present topic of 
Europe, this article engages a frame of historical perspective, the underlying suggestion of which is 
that since the other issues were eventually resolved, it may be assumed that the latest problem will 
be as well.  Less positively, the unqualified inclusion of appeasement as an example of “serious 
disagreements” represents a categorical assumption that appeasement represents political 
irresponsibility.  While signalling appeasement as an irresponsible term to use, it also presents 
appeasement as a suitable term to portray and engage in political antagonism: 
 
Tory Brexiteers must tone down their language because it is fuelling death threats towards 
MPs in their party, a former minister claimed yesterday.  Remainer Nicky Morgan said that 
Conservative colleagues are acting recklessly by using works like “betrayal” to describe 
Theresa May’s handling of Brexit.  She hit out after veteran Brexiteer Bill Cash said the Prime 
Minister had been guilty of “capitulation” and “appeasement” to Brussels and called 
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Remainers pushing for the softest possible Brexit – or no Brexit al all - “devious” (The 
Express 2019)  
 
Here, we see appeasement’s association with the politics of attack and conflict.  While its use here is 
predicated on the recklessness of accusing a colleague of appeasement, it sets Sir Bill Cash, lent 
added esteem by the modifier “veteran”, against one woman (Nicky Morgan) complaining of his 
aggression and another woman (Theresa May) presented as the target of Cash’s hostility.  On the 
one hand, this presents Cash’s use of language as aggressive and irresponsible, reiterating 
“appeasement’s” contribution to the antagonism, while contextualising this anger with his length of 
service and experience.  
 
While providing an opportunity to amplify the emotional engagement of pro-Brexit MPs, this 
established meaning that appeasement enjoys also enables former officials such as former Chairman 
of the Bank of England Mervyn King (2018) to also offer it as an example of UK governments having 
betrayed the confidence of their citizens, modified only by the timeframe “in the 1930s” (King 2018). 
 
In a manner that draws upon this reservoir of historical meaning and contextual resonance, there is 
also scope to deploy appeasement in specific reference to Brexit, as this example from The Express 
shows: 
 
It was the unaccountable EU, not Britain, that was in profound trouble because of its 
obsession with federal integration and the destruction of national identities, an outlook that 
has triggered angry populist movements throughout the continent.  In Italy, Hungary, 
Austria, Germany and now Sweden, anti-immigration parties are major forces, something 
13 
 
 
that would have been unthinkable only a few years ago. Yet instead of exploiting Britain's 
advantages our Government displayed timidity and appeasement.  As Boris puts it: "At every 
stage in talks so far Brussels gets what it wants." So the EU's demand for a £39billion so-
called "divorce" bill was agreed without anything in return, while the minor question of the 
Northern Ireland border was absurdly turned into a deal-breaking obstacle (McKinstry, The 
Express 2018). 
 
This extracts develops from a summary of context expressed within an explicitly political register 
(“federal integration”, “angry populist movements”) to the reported speech of Boris Johnson 
invoking a “divorce” metaphor of domestic strife.  The sentence linking these registers projects a 
contrast between the empowered action of “exploiting” and the associations of surrender and 
vulnerability in “timidity and appeasement”.  The advocacy of empowered action on Johnson’s part 
is consistent with the article’s explicit alignment with Johnson’s style of engagement and talent for 
“generating controversy”, partly betrayed in the familiar use of his first name “Boris”.  Although just 
coincidentally alongside his use of a divorce analogy, the same article’s introduction refers to 
Johnson’s private life and its relationship with his public profile and its gendered associations: 
 
Last week again, he dominated the headlines, this time through his private life, whose 
wayward exuberance has led to the breakdown of his 25-year-old marriage.  Yet if diehard 
Remainers and his Tory enemies thought Boris would be shamed into temporary silence 
then they badly misjudged him (McKinstry, The Express 2018). 
 
There are two forms of description that are worth highlighting initially.  The first is the euphemism 
“wayward exuberance” to refer to an extra-marital affair on Johnson’s part.  In terms of expected 
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behaviours, “exuberance” implies an excess of energy and cheer, rather than misconduct.  As such, 
this uses the assumption that exuberant masculine behaviour includes sexual infidelity in order to 
assess Johnson positively.  In stark contrast to Johnson’s playful waywardness, those wishing to 
retain the UK’s place within the EU are presented in unshifting terms as “diehards”.  Notably too, 
where judgement is applied to Johnson, the focus rests on his thirst for publicity, on which matter 
Johnson is presented as having indulged his masculine instincts and defied his critics. 
 
The Dunkirk spirit 
 
Having looked at how appeasement offers a means of describing concession in manner that is 
conventionally associated with dealings with Europe and accords with masculine discourses of a 
politics of contest and aggressiveness, we will now look to a still more lexically specific 
representation of relations with the European mainland: references to the 1940 evacuation of British 
Expeditionary Force and allied troops from the beach at Dunkirk.  The phrase “Dunkirk spirit” has 
largely been incorporated into everyday use in Britain, to refer to the efforts of groups of 
downtrodden citizens to prevail under trying circumstances.  For example, Tiresias’ (1984, 20) 
travelogue Notes from Overground attributes English commuters’ stoicism in the face of institutional 
incompetence to their possession of the “the Dunkirk spirit all right”.  From the contemporary 
examples that mention Brexit, this first example from The Express refers to the stereotypical British 
commuter’s topic of small talk, the weather: 
 
It is no wonder we can't crack Brexit if our once great country is paralysed by a few inches of 
snow. If the EU has been laughing at our negotiating skills, they'll be splitting their sides 
today at how pathetic we are in the face of a bit of bad weather […] So what happened to 
15 
 
 
our Dunkirk spirit, our do-or-die attitude? When I was a kid growing up in Newcastle, we 
routinely had a foot of snow overnight. No school ever closed and if the bus didn't come or 
the car didn't start, I had to walk to school three miles. Everyone did it (Malone, The Express 
2019). 
 
This is an opinion column by a personality journalist, emphasising their credentials to speak on the 
basis of personal and collective experience.  As well as the Dunkirk spirit, related expressions of 
British determination are called upon (“Our do-or-die attitude”, “Everyone did it”).  Using inclusive 
pronouns, the readers are interpellated into a shared perceptual world in explicitly national terms 
(“our once great country”, “how pathetic we are”), while marginalising the European Union as 
ungenerous witnesses to Britain’s folly (“they’ll be splitting their sides”).  Moreover, while this 
illustrates Dunkirk’s role in marking out an inherent antagonism between Britain and Europe, the 
next extract from the Mail on Sunday mobilises the association of the Dunkirk spirit with military 
rather than rhetorical acrimony: 
 
“[Headline] AS WILLIAMSON INVOKES DUNKIRK SPIRIT: I WILL ORDER THE NAVY TO REPLACE 
CHANNEL FERRIES. [Intro] The Royal Navy could be pressed into action to ferry vital supplies 
across the channel in the event of a No Deal Brexit, Government sources have told the Mail 
on Sunday (Owen, Mail on Sunday 2019). 
 
The military implications of this speculative news story are most obvious in its reference to the 
services of the Royal Navy.  Furthermore, “Dunkirk spirit” is invoked amidst a range of items from 
the military lexicon, from the use of “order” to describe government minister Williamson’s proposed 
speech act to invoke Dunkirk, to the navy-specific historical term “pressed into action”.  This may be 
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said to be a perverse reconfiguration of the phrase that it be applied to the endeavours of a national 
institution, since the Dunkirk evacuations were conducted by citizen sailors in support of an over-
stretched Royal Navy.  Yet, we see a similar association between the Dunkirk spirit and the 
coordinated might of the institution in the following example, from the business section of the Daily 
Telegraph:   
 
“Exporters and firms exposed to foreign currency risks have also been identified as 
potentially hazardous for banks, the source said.  A rival bank executive told The Telegraph 
in July that the industry may have to invoke a ‘Dunkirk spirit’ to support the economy: 
‘Extending credit to firms impacted is one thing we’re looking at’” (Withers, The Daily 
Telegraph 2018). 
 
Whereas the previous example was weighted in the language of military order, this occupies the 
expressive field of economics, where the reported speech of the bank executive places “Dunkirk 
spirit” alongside field-appropriate adjectives “extending” and “impacted”.  In this regard, the extract 
confirms Boers and Demecheleer’s (1997, 116) identification of a dominant “war metaphor” in the 
expression of economic relationships.  As well as investing conventionally expressed institutional 
action with the common virtue and spiritedness of Dunkirk, this example joins with the other in 
expressing the developing commercial relationship between Britain and the European in conflictual 
terms. 
 
Yet, just as the Dunkirk spirit can be mobilised as a nationalist call to arms, in a manner which 
articulates politics with masculine militarism, so can an emphasis be placed on its status as a 
contested and problematic term.  We have already referred to the columns of Marina Hyde that 
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situate these war discourses within a toxic and aggressive masculinity, and pointed to examples of 
problematisation in the use of appeasement, and the following extract from a Guardian column 
stresses the complicity of British popular culture in foregrounding myths of nation founded in a 
misremembering of war: 
 
When Dad's Army launched, Paul Fox, then the controller of BBC One, was worried that it 
might offend veterans or those who'd lost loved ones in a war that had ended less than 25 
years earlier. In the event, he found that its soft-focus portrait of defiant Britain muddling 
along was just how people wanted to remember it. It was reassuring in the turbulent and 
uncertain 1960s to be reminded that pomposity, hierarchy and incompetence had somehow 
produced victory, and it played into the idea that it was the Dunkirk spirit and British genius 
rather than the mighty US war machine that had won the war (Perkins, The Guardian 2018). 
 
In a manner that has echoes of our analysis of appeasement, this extract produces a more critical 
and reflexive interpretation of the usefulness of the Dunkirk spirit.  The phrase appears only at the 
end of a lengthy paragraph in which the reader has already been altered to its absurdity, through the 
use of irony (“pomposity, hierarchy and incompetence had somehow produced victory”) and 
culminating in a sardonic contrast between “spirit” and “genius” against “machine”.  So while the 
Dunkirk spirit provides a means to express collective action against the machinations of an enemy 
EU in a manner that extends from the original agent of the resourceful citizen to the national 
institution, the appropriateness of its use is as contested as a posturing on the platform of a set of 
far-fetched war myths.  This performative component of the masculine posture and its contestability 
in a context of widespread political personalisation is pursued still more vividly in the next section. 
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The Military Man: Masculinity Challenged 
 
A more intentional and explicit claim to masculinity, and its articulation with the Brexit project, calls 
upon an even less subtle exercise in inhabiting the military bearing that is central to the discharge of 
Brexit.  In the following extract from a widely shared interview, this retreat to discourses around 
military service and heroism are more straightforward in their personalisation by the enunciator, 
while also revealing the extent to which these discourses are subject to challenge.  The interview is 
between the political editor for Sky News (“I” in the transcript) and the Conservative MP and 
prominent Brexit-supporter Mark Francois (“MF in the transcript), and the occasion is the aftermath 
of a House of Commons debate over the Brexit arrangements, bringing a further delay to the UK’s 
exit has resulted: 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
I 
 
 
 
 
MF 
I 
 
MF 
I 
MF 
 
The Commons has just ruled out a no deal (.) Brexit (.) tomorrow they’ll vote for 
an exte:nsion ah you’ve got May May’s deal as an option (.) the likelihood is that 
what they’ll do is vote for a softer Brexit custom union (.) an all of you guys (.) 
haven’t got an option (..) the best choice you’ve got is May’s deal (.) why won’t 
you just back it 
Because it means we don’t leave the European Union 
                                                                                      [You’ve not leaving anyway (.) 
they’ve just voted that you’re not leaving you have an extension 
                                                                                                           [Ah no 
You got a no deal off the table 
                                               [No with respect that’s not what they voted for (.) by 
four votes (..) four 
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13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
I 
MF 
 
 
I 
MF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I 
 
 
MF 
 
I 
                          [Yeh but it still passed 
                                                          [Yeh but hang on (.) they voted that we wouldn’t 
leave on the twenty-ninth of March well that we wouldn’t leave with no deal (.) 
okay that’s one thing 
                              [And then 
                                             [Right but you (.) sorry cause you’re mixing up a lot of 
things here if I may say so (.) with regards to the withdrawal agreement (..) 
whatever people think of Members of Parliament (.) and I’m under no illusions 
about that (.) they can read (.) and we’ve read the withdrawal agreement and 
we it means we don’t leave the EU (..) so if we give them two choices (.) which is 
stay in the European Union (.) and vote for the withdrawal agreement to stay in 
the European Union (…) we’re not gonna vote for the withdrawal agreement 
when it keeps us in the EU (.) we’re just not gonna do it 
I just see it just seems to me that tonight your (.) options are narrowing as it is 
the Prime Minister (.) uhm and you’re still ploughing on I just don’t understand 
why you don’t just take her deal and bank the win 
I think that I’ve tried to explain it’s because it’s not a win it’s a lose (.) I’m not 
banking a lose (.) I was in the army and I wasn’t trained to lose 
Okay (.) alright 
 
 
This starts off as a relatively conventional “broadcast news interview” (Montgomery, 2007), in which 
the interviewer formulates questions that summarise the circumstances for the benefit of the 
overhearing audience in a manner designed to provoke the interviewee.  Elements of informality are 
in evidence throughout, with the designation “you guys” (line 3) used by the interviewer to place 
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stress upon Francois’ capacity to speak freely on behalf of the pro-Brexit “European Research 
Group”.  As is characteristic of such interview arrangements, there then follows a series of turns in 
which the interpretation of the topic under discussion – the implications of then-Prime Minister 
May’s proposals for the implementation of Brexit – are disputed between the interviewer and 
interviewee, most notably with Francois’ refusal of the interviewer’s question (“sorry cause you’re 
mixing up a lot of things here if I may say so”, lines 18-19).   
 
However, whereas the interviewer’s earlier contributions were marked by categorical assertions 
such as “You got a no deal off the table” (line 10) and “Yeh but it still passed” (line 14), the 
interviewer then engages Francois in a more subjective style using what Montgomery (2007, 122) 
calls “markers of propositional attitude” in “I just see it seems to me tonight your options are 
narrowing” (line 27) and “I just don’t understand why you don’t just take her deal” (line 29).  In 
addition to producing an unusual degree of personal alignment on the part of the interviewer, this 
produces a correspondingly subjective response from Francois.  Initially, the expression of the 
context-appropriate degree of commitment in Francois produces a cooperative marker of attitude in 
responding to the interviewer’s formulation “bank the win” (“I think that I’ve tried to explain 
because it’s not a win it’s a lose”, line 30).  Significantly, however, Francois then sustains the 
win/lose trop to implicitly attribute this determination and resolve to his experience of military 
service (“I was in the army and I wasn’t trained to lose”, line 31).  In terms of his status within the 
exchange, Francois pulls upon the dominance of military discourses in the debate to produce what 
Clayman and Heritage (2002: 168) refer to as an attempt at credibility enhancement. 
 
Comparatively quickly, and propelled by social media reaction, Francois’ claim to military experience 
was extracted as the “money shot” of the interview.  Newspaper columnist Marina Hyde (2019) 
who, as noted above, has remarked on the hyper-masculinity associated with Brexit, made sardonic 
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reference to Francois’ claim to a military attitude by referring to Francois “who you may know serves 
as Second Lieutenant in the Brexit Catering Corps (Territorial)”.  This has echoes of previous claims 
to military credentials or legacies by UK politicians.  Perhaps most notably, then-Secretary of State 
for Defence Michael Portillo’s invoked the spirit of the “SAS” as embodying that of the UK in an 
earlier era of negotiations with the European Union, a remark that occasioned widespread ridicule 
(Bellamy 1995).  Whatever the credibility of Francois’ army experience, the claim is read within a 
critical environment in which the militaristic overtones of the campaign have already been 
problematised.  Thus, as Street (2004) reflects, the foregrounding of resources of self in order to 
burnish a political position is limited by the reputational capital of the politician, combined with the 
recognisability of a claim as a political tactic.  In this sense, the use of masculinity is subject to similar 
limits to those that apply to populist tactics, such that their sustained deployment produces a 
counterproductive association with the existent lexical field of establishment politics (Higgins, 2013). 
 
Conclusion 
 
What we see during the Brexit campaign is the articulation of particular forms of masculinity and 
ordinariness, with the associated capacity to offer insights associated with “common sense” rather 
than political interests.  There are numerous historical precedents for this, and De Blasio et al (2012) 
point to the presentation of 1930s UK Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin as “Farmer Stan”, with a 
country gentleman’s love of field sports and livestock.  One key difference between that case and 
the examples considered here is that Baldwin entwines the common touch with the majesty of 
power, whereas the Brexit campaign mobilises British masculinity as antithetical to the political 
establishment and its effete admiration for Europe.  Thus, while both call upon the reassuring tropes 
of manhood, the contemporary example of Brexit articulates these with a cultural iteration of 
nationalist populism. 
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Through the example of Francois in particular, we see that performances of masculinity may be 
subject to the same forms of popular judgement as other political competences and types of political 
performance.  For one thing, there is the obligation of those politicians seeking to adopt a populist 
mantle to appear “unpolitical”, in this case by producing the “bad manners” (Moffitt 2016) of 
masculine excess.  However, these performative tactics diminish in power the more prominent these 
modes of performance become in the political sphere.  The second factor is answerability to what 
Street (2004) emphasises as the performative capabilities and credentials of the individual behind 
the political persona.  As we reflect upon the mythical character of masculinity (Connell 2002), so the 
contingencies of the masculine and its political purchase become apparent: both in terms of the 
inflation of the necessary performative claims and the demonstrable qualities of the individual. 
 
However, the very contestability of this association between machismo and war can also be keeping 
with the desired problematic association with the political centre.  Like the “Bernie Bro” tag 
associated with male supporters of US presidential candidate Bernie Saunders, what may be 
presented as excessive masculinity is both celebrated and criticised in tandem; foregrounding an 
exclusionary “gang” mentality while presenting evidence for what Katz (2016) describes as Saunders’ 
“street fighter” appeal.  As Davies (2007) points out in his analysis of the rise of white male 
politicians and anti-intellectualism, exposing the shortcomings of political masculinity – “male 
authority reconstituted around the admission of its limitations” (Davis 2007, 190) – might perversely 
solidify the position of the self-styled political renegade as eternal outsider.  As with other forms of 
populist discourse, and in keeping with the political antagonism within which it thrives, the 
application of scorn can fuel rather than dowse. 
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